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Abstract
Online bipartite matching (OBM) is a fundamental model underpinning many important
applications, including search engine advertisement, website banner and pop-up ads, and ride-
hailing. We study the i.i.d. OBM problem, where one side of the bipartition is fixed and
known in advance, while nodes from the other side appear sequentially as i.i.d. realizations of an
underlying distribution, and must immediately be matched or discarded. We introduce dynamic
relaxations of the set of achievable matching probabilities, show how they theoretically dominate
lower-dimensional, static relaxations from previous work, and perform a polyhedral study to
theoretically examine the new relaxations’ strength. We also discuss how to derive heuristic
policies from the relaxations’ dual prices, in a similar fashion to dynamic resource prices used
in network revenue management. We finally present a computational study to demonstrate the
empirical quality of the new relaxations and policies.
1 Introduction
Many important and emerging applications in e-commerce and in the internet more generally can be
modeled as online two-sided markets, with buyers and sellers dynamically appearing and conducting
transactions. When a platform or other entity controls or manages one side of this market (usually
the supply) and can choose what product to offer to dynamically appearing buyers, the system in
question can be modeled as an online bipartite matching (OBM) problem. As more services move
to online platforms in the coming years, the ubiquity and importance of OBM models will only
increase.
An important application of OBM and its generalizations is in the rapidly growing sector of
digital advertisement; in their US Ad Spending Estimates and Forecast for 2017, eMarketer reports
that digital ad spending reached $83 billion last year, an almost 16% year-over-year increase.
Within digital marketing, search engine advertisement yields one application of OBM and similar
models [18, 19]: Users input search terms, and the engine displays ad links in addition to the actual
search results. The engine chooses the ad(s) to display (i.e. matches an ad to a user) based on the
search term, user information, and advertisers’ preferences and budget, with one typical objective
being to maximize the expected revenue collected from advertisers. Similarly, OBM models can be
applied to website banner and pop-up ads; here, each time a user loads a website, the site manager
can choose ad(s) to display based on the user’s information and browsing history as well as the
advertisers’ budget and target market.
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OBM also finds applications in ride-hailing [21], another rapidly growing sector – one study
by Goldman Sachs in 2017 projected that global revenues in the industry could reach $285 billion
by 20301. Within these systems, when a user requests a ride, the ride-hailing platform must
match them to an available driver, with the overall goal of maximizing some measure of customer
satisfaction or utility (for example, by minimizing users’ average waiting time before a pickup).
As in classical deterministic bipartite matching, OBM involves matching nodes on opposite
sides of a bipartite graph, with the objective of maximizing the cardinality of the matching or a
more general weight function. In online versions of the problem, nodes on one or both sides of the
bipartition may appear and/or disappear dynamically, matches are often irrevocable, and decisions
must usually be made with only partial information about the underlying graph. In the version
of OBM we study here, one side of the bipartition is fixed and known, representing the goods
or resources the platform can offer; the nodes from the other side, representing customers, arrive
sequentially, one at a time. Upon each arrival, the platform must immediately and irrevocably
match the arriving node to a remaining compatible node from the other side, or discard it. We
assume arriving nodes are i.i.d. draws from an underlying uniform distribution over possible node
“types”, representing customer classes that may or may not be compatible with different resources
or goods. For example, in search engine advertisement, advertisers indicate which search terms they
wish their ads displayed with, and the search engine can only match ads with terms in these classes.
The i.i.d. assumption implies this model is applicable in situations where the platform can forecast
customer behavior, e.g. based on past arrival data, and where this behavior is relatively stable
over time. The model may not be as applicable in data-poor situations where the platform cannot
confidently forecast customer behavior; the literature includes more conservative models for such
cases [18], culminating with the adversarial model studied in [13]. Conversely, if customer behavior
can be forecast but is not necessarily stable over time, the assumption of identical distributions may
be problematic. While we are not aware of OBM models for this case, the revenue management
literature includes many works in this vein, particularly in network revenue management, e.g. [22].
We briefly survey related work below.
Perhaps because of its applicability in search engine advertisement, the algorithms community
has extensively studied i.i.d. OBM and related models for the past decade, starting with [8]. For
the i.i.d. variant with cardinality objective, this work typically focuses on developing heuristic
matching policies with multiplicative worst-case performance guarantees. It is straightforward to
see that a simple policy based on solving a max-flow relaxation achieves at least 1 − 1/e ≈ 0.63
of the optimal policy, and this ratio in fact matches the best possible competitive ratio in the
adversarial case [13]; [8] established that in the less conservative i.i.d. model a better ratio is indeed
possible. Currently, the best guarantee of this type is roughly 0.71 [11] (and it is slightly better
under additional assumptions).
The analysis of these heuristic policies and their worst-case guarantees relies on simple linear
programming (LP) relaxations, often with network flow structure. However, there is comparably far
less work focusing directly on the derivation of strong relaxations for i.i.d. OBM, even though these
relaxations provide dual upper bounds useful for benchmarking any new heuristic policies and often
can be employed in policy design as well. The only work along these lines we are aware are of is [24],
which builds on the network flow relaxations used in [8], and subsequent papers, by adding more
sophisticated valid inequalities derived from probabilistic arguments. Though somewhat unusual in
the algorithms or optimization literature, this approach can be interpreted as a version of achievable
region techniques from queueing theory and applied probability; see e.g. [3, 6].
1C. Huston. “Ride-hailing industry expected to grow eightfold to $285 billion by 2030.” MarketWatch, published
May 27, 2017.
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1.1 Contribution
Starting with [8], to the best of our knowledge all known relaxations for i.i.d. OBM are “static”:
Although the process occurs dynamically over a horizon with sequential decision epochs, the relax-
ations use as their primary variables the probability that an arriving customer node of some type is
ever matched to a fixed resource node. Though this reduces the number of variables to consider, it
also means the corresponding relaxations are coarser and looser, as they cannot easily capture the
model’s dynamics. Furthermore, with few exceptions, the policies derived from such relaxations
are also mostly static in nature; that is, though a decision may depend on the arriving node type
and the remaining available resource nodes, it usually does not depend on the decision epoch itself
and how far or close it might be from the end of the horizon.
Our main contribution is to explicitly account for the problem’s sequential nature and consider
dynamic relaxations. Specifically, these relaxations use as decision variables the probability that
a particular match occurs in a particular stage. Using these time-indexed probabilities affords
several modeling advantages, such as allowing us to include edge weights that vary by time and
thus simplify the analysis by capturing all compatibility information in the objective.
Of course, the primary appeal of dynamic relaxations is the possibility of providing tighter
dual bounds for the model. As one of our main results, we establish that our simplest dynamic
relaxation is provably at least as tight as the best-performing relaxation from [24]; furthermore,
the latter relaxation includes exponentially many inequalities and relies on a separation algorithm,
whereas our new relaxation has polynomially many variables and constraints. To further understand
our new relaxation, we also perform a polyhedral study, demonstrating that all of its inequalities
are facet-defining for the underlying polytope of achievable probabilities. We then extend this
polyhedral study and introduce more complex inequalities, all facet-defining as well. Our empirical
study verifies the strength of the new relaxation; it improves the previous best gaps by 4% to 5%
in absolute terms on average.
As a secondary contribution, we also show how our new relaxation can be leveraged to construct
a dynamic heuristic policy. Although this kind of policy is new in OBM to our knowledge, our
policy can be viewed as the OBM analogue to dynamic bid price policies, introduced in [1] for
network revenue management. To design the policy, we establish a connection between our relax-
ation and a value function approximation of the model’s dynamic programming (DP) formulation.
Our empirical results also verify the new policy’s quality in comparison to the best empirically
performing policies from the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way: After a brief literature survey at
the end of this section, Section 2 formulates the problem, and summarizes pertinent previous results.
Section 3 introduces our relaxations and gives our theoretical results, while Section 4 outlines our
computational study. Section 5 concludes and discusses possible future work. An Appendix has
mathematical proofs not included in the body of the paper.
1.2 Literature Review
The OBM model was introduced by [13], who studied the adversarial version in which node arrivals
are not governed by a distribution, but rather by an adversary whose objective is to maximize
the difference between the cardinality of the decision maker’s matching and the offline optimum.
The authors show that a randomized ranking algorithm that chooses a random permutation of
the resource nodes and matches the highest-ranked available and compatible node according to the
permutation yields an optimal competitive ratio of 1−1/e; see e.g. [4] for a simplified and corrected
proof.
3
Most work on OBM since has focused on less conservative variants. The i.i.d. version with
cardinality objective was first studied in [8], who showed that in this version the performance
guarantee could be strictly better than 1− 1/e; they also used a network flow relaxation to design
their two suggested matchings policy. Subsequent work has focused on improving the performance
guarantee and/or generalizing the objective, and typically relies on LP relaxations with network
flow structure, e.g. [2, 5, 10, 17]. For the cardinality case, [11] have the current state of the art, a
policy based on a max-flow relaxation with a guarantee of approximately 0.71.
The i.i.d. version of OBM (sometimes also called the known i.i.d. model) is in some sense the
least conservative OBM variant, compared to the most conservative adversarial version. Some
authors have studied models that compromise between the two. For example, in the random
permutation model an adversary chooses the graph, but the arriving nodes are revealed in a random
order not controlled by the adversary. With this slight relaxation of the adversarial framework, [9]
show that for the cardinality objective a simple greedy algorithm, which matches an arriving node
to any remaining compatible node, achieves a competitive ratio of 1−1/e; later improvements came
in [12, 16]. Other models, variants and extensions have appeared in the algorithms literature; we
refer the reader to the survey [18].
While the notion of dynamic relaxations appears to be new in the OBM context, there is a
stream of related literature in network revenue management, beginning with [1], who introduced
dynamic bid relaxations and their corresponding policies. In this literature, the goal is often to show
that a particular relaxation can be computed efficiently, e.g. [15, 23, 25], as a naive formulation
involves a separation problem solved via an integer program. These dynamic relaxations have also
been extended to customer choice models, e.g. [25, 26].
2 Model Description and Preliminaries
The OBM model is formulated using two finite disjoint sets N and V , with the process occurring
dynamically in the following way. The right-hand node set V , with |V | = m, is known and given
ahead of time. The left-hand set N with |N | = n represents different node types that may appear,
but we do not know which ones will appear and how often. We know only that T left-hand nodes
in total will appear sequentially, each one drawn independently from the uniform distribution over
node types N . That is, at each epoch a node from one of the types in N appears with probability
1/n and must be immediately (and irrevocably) matched to a remaining available node in V or
discarded; two or more nodes from the same type may appear throughout the process, each treated
as a separate copy. Matching i ∈ N to j ∈ V in stage t yields a (known) reward or weight wtij ,
and the objective is to maximize the expected weight of the matching. Following convention from
previous literature and the motivating application of search engine advertisement, we call i ∈ N an
impression, and each j ∈ V an ad.
By considering time-indexed weights wtij , we generalize much of the existing literature and can
avoid dealing with specific graph structure. In particular, we may assume that the process occurs
in a complete bipartite graph, i.e. every node type in N is connected or compatible with every node
in V ; non-existent edges simply get weight zero.
Moreover, we can assume m = n = T without loss of generality. Indeed, if m < T we add
dummy nodes to V and assign zero weight to all corresponding edges. Similarly, if m > T we
increase the number of stages and give zero weight to all edges in the new stages. If n > m = T ,
we again add dummy nodes and stages. Finally, if n < m = T we make κ copies of every node
type in N (and the corresponding edges) for the smallest κ with κn ≥ m, then proceed as before.
To ease notation, in the remainder of the paper we write n for m and T , but we use the indices i
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for impressions, j for ads, and t for stages. We use the shorthand [n] := {1, . . . , n}, and identify
singleton sets with their unique element.
2.1 DP and LP Formulations
Let η be the random variable with uniform distribution over N . We count stages down from n,
meaning stage t occurs when t decision epochs (including the current one) remain in the process.
We can now give a DP formulation for this OBM model. Let v∗t (i, S) denote the optimal expected
value given that i ∈ N appears in stage t when the set of ads S ⊆ V is available. Then, for all
t = 1, . . . , n, i ∈ N and S ⊆ V ,
v∗t (i, S) = max
{
maxj∈S{w
t
ij + Eη[v
∗
t−1(η, S\j)]}
Eη[v
∗
t−1(η, S)],
(1)
where v∗0(·, ·) is identically zero, and the optimal expected value of the model is given by Eη[v
∗
n(η, V )] =
1/n
∑
i∈N v
∗
n(i, V ). The first term in this recursion corresponds to matching i with one of the re-
maining ads j ∈ S; the second corresponds to discarding i. As with any DP, the optimal value
function v∗ induces an optimal policy: At any state (t, i, S), we choose an action that attains the
maximum in (1).
Using a standard reformulation (see e.g. [20]), we can capture the recursion (1) with the linear
program
min
v≥0
Eη[vn(η, V )] (2a)
s.t. vt(i, S ∪ j)− Eη[vt−1(η, S)] ≥ w
t
ij , t ∈ [n], i ∈ N, j ∈ V, S ⊆ V \j (2b)
vt(i, S)− Eη[vt−1(η, S)] ≥ 0, t ∈ [n], i ∈ N, S ⊆ V. (2c)
The value function v∗ defined in (1) is optimal for (2). Moreover, this LP is a strong dual for OBM;
any feasible v has an objective greater than or equal to Eη[v
∗
n(η, V )]. The dual of (2) is a primal
formulation where any feasible solution encodes a feasible policy and its probability of choosing
any action from any state in the DP. That formulation is the LP
max
x,y≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈V
∑
t∈[n]
∑
S⊆V \j
wtijx
t,S
i,j (3a)
s.t.
∑
j∈V
x
n,V \j
i,j + y
n,V
i ≤
1
n
, i ∈ N, (3b)
∑
j∈S
x
t,S\j
i,j + y
t,S
i · 1{t6=1} −
1
n
· 1{|S|>t} ·
∑
k∈N
yt+1,Sk
−
1
n
∑
k∈N
∑
j∈V \S
xt+1,Sk,j ≤ 0, t ∈ [n− 1], i ∈ N, ∅ 6= S ⊂ V, |S| ≥ t,
(3c)
∑
j∈V
x
t,V \j
i,j + y
t,V
i · 1{t6=1} −
1
n
∑
k∈N
yt+1,Vk ≤ 0, i ∈ N, t ∈ [n− 1]. (3d)
We denote by 1A the indicator function for a condition A, which takes value one if condition A is
satisfied, zero otherwise. Decision variable xt,Si,j represents the probability that the policy chooses
to match impression i to ad j in state (t, i, S ∪ j), and yt,Si similarly represents a discarding action.
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As with its dual, (3) has exponentially many variables and constraints, and is therefore difficult
to analyze directly. However, we can equivalently consider the probability that a feasible policy
makes a particular match between i and j in stage t without tracking the other remaining ads
S ⊆ V \ j; this corresponds to optimizing over a projection of the feasible region of (3),
max
{∑
i∈N
∑
j∈V
∑
t∈[n]
wtijz
t
ij : ∃ (x, y) ≥ 0 satisfying (3b)–(3d) with z
t
ij =
∑
S⊆V \j
xt,Si,j
}
,
where ztij is the probability that impression i is matched to ad j in stage t. Any such z is a vector of
matching probabilities that is achievable by at least one feasible policy. Let Q denote this projected
polyhedron in the space of ztij variables, and note that Q is full-dimensional in R
n3 . Optimizing
over Q is as difficult as solving the original DP formulation (1), but optimizing over any relaxation
of Q yields a valid upper bound; this is our main goal.
2.2 Relevant Previous Work
Most previous results concerning relaxations for OBM use a lower-dimensional projection of the
feasible region of (3). Specifically, assuming edge weights are static across stages, wtij = wij for
t ∈ [n], consider
max
{∑
i∈N
∑
j∈V
wijzij : ∃ (x, y) ≥ 0 satisfying (3b)–(3d) with zij =
∑
t∈[n]
∑
S⊆V \j
xt,Si,j
}
,
where zij is the probability that impression i is ever matched to ad j. Let Q
′ denote this projected
polyhedron in the space of zij variables, and observe that Q
′ is also a projection of Q via zij =∑
t∈[n] z
t
ij . The following max flow (or deterministic bipartite matching) LP is known to be a
relaxation of Q′ and has been used to study Q′ in several works starting with [8]:
max
z≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈V
wijzij (4a)
s.t.
∑
j∈V
zij ≤ T/n = 1, i ∈ N (4b)
∑
i∈N
zij ≤ 1, j ∈ V. (4c)
In this relaxation, constraints (4b) limit the expected number of times an impression type can be
matched to T/n = 1, the expected number of times it will appear, while (4c) state that each ad is
matched at most once.
To our knowledge, the only past work that specifically focuses on polyhedral relaxations of Q′
is [24], which presents several classes of valid inequalities, including the right-star inequalities,∑
i∈I
zij ≤ 1− (1− |I|/n)
n, j ∈ V, I ⊆ N, (5)
which yield the best empirical bounds when added to (4). Although exponential in number, these
inequalities can be separated over in polynomial time by a simple greedy algorithm. We use the
bound given by (4) with (5) as a theoretical and empirical benchmark to test our new relaxations.
6
3 Dynamic Relaxations
We introduce various classes of valid inequalities for Q and study their facial dimension. These
inequalities always include variables corresponding to complete bipartite subgraphs; therefore, to
ease notation we define
ZtI,J :=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
ztij , I ⊆ N,J ⊆ V.
We begin by presenting a simple inequality class to motivate our approach. For an impression
i ∈ N , the probability of matching i in each stage t ∈ [n] is at most 1/n; this corresponds to
Zti,V ≤ 1/n, i ∈ N, t ∈ [n]. (6)
Note that by summing these constraints over all t for a fixed i, we obtain (4b).
Proposition 1. Constraints (6) are facet-defining for the polyhedron of achievable probabilities Q.
Proof. Fix i ∈ N and t ∈ [n]. We use eτk,j ∈ R
n3 to denote the canonical vector, i.e., a vector with
a one in the coordinate (k, j, τ) and zero elsewhere, indicating that we match impression k with ad
j in stage τ . We construct the following n3 affinely independent points corresponding to policies
that satisfy (6) with equality:
• Policy for (i, j, t) with j ∈ V : If i appears in stage t, which happens with probability 1/n, we
match it with j. This corresponds to the point 1
n
eti,j .
• Policy for (k, j, τ) with j ∈ V , τ 6= t, and k ∈ N : If k appears in stage τ (with probability
1/n), we match it to j. Then, if i appears in stage t with probability 1/n, we match it to
some ℓ ∈ V , ℓ 6= j, so we have the point 1
n
eτk,j +
1
n
eti,ℓ.
• Policy for (k, j, t) with j ∈ V , and k 6= i: If k appears in stage t (with probability 1/n), we
match it to j. On the other hand, if i appears in stage t with probability 1/n, we match it
to some ℓ ∈ V , ℓ 6= j, so we have the point 1
n
etk,j +
1
n
eti,ℓ.
These points are linearly independent, which implies they are affinely independent.
We now introduce our general inequality family. Fix a set of ads J ⊆ V and a family of
impression sets It ⊆ N , t ∈ [n]. For any vector α ∈ R
n
+, we have a valid inequality for Q of the
form
n∑
t=1
αtZ
t
It,J ≤ R(α, (It), J), (7)
where R(α, (It), J) defines the maximum of the left-hand side over Q. As one example, inequalities
(6) are a special case of (7) where J = V , It = {i}, αt = 1, and Iτ = ∅, ατ = 0 for τ 6= t.
Proposition 2. For α ∈ Rn+, set family It ⊆ N , t ∈ [n], and J ⊆ V , constraints (7) are valid for
the polyhedron of achievable probabilities Q, and R(α, (It), J) can be computed in polynomial time
via a DP.
Proof. Define variables pt ∈ {0, 1} to indicate whether a node from It appears in stage t or not,
and denote by d ∈ {0, . . . , |J |} the number of remaining nodes from J . Given this, we can state
a DP recursion using the value function R(t, d, pt), the expected value in stage t when d nodes
from J are available and pt has occurred. For example, if only one stage remains, d nodes from J
are available, and no element of I1 appears, R(1, d, 0) = 0 since we cannot match any node in I1.
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Conversely, R(1, d, 1) = α1min{1, d}, since we can match a node and obtain value α1 as long as at
least one element of J remains.
In general, if d nodes are available in stage t and no node from It appears (pt = 0), then the
expected value R(t, d, 0) can be computed recursively by conditioning on terms from stage t− 1:
R(t, d, 0) =
n− |It|
n
R(t− 1, d, 0) +
|It|
n
R(t− 1, d, 1).
On the other hand, to compute R(t, d, 1) we choose the maximum between discarding or matching,
with value
R(t, d, 1) = max{R(t− 1, d, 0), αt +R(t− 1, d− 1, 0)}
Finally, the value of the right-hand side is
R(α, (It), J) =
n− |In|
n
R(n, |J |, 0) +
|In|
n
R(n, |J |, 1).
The number of states is n × |J | × 2 = O(n2) and the number of operations to calculate a state’s
value is constant, so the entire recursion takes O(n2) time.
In the remainder of this section, we study particular cases of inequalities (7). We construct
them intuitively using probabilistic arguments, but their right-hand sides can also be calculated
directly using the DP from Proposition 2.
As a first example, let i ∈ N , j ∈ V and t ∈ [n − 1]. Matching i to j in stage t implies the
intersection of two independent events. First, j is not matched in any previous stage [t+1, n], and
second, i appears in stage t. In terms of probability this means
P(match i with j in t) ≤
1
n
(1− P(match j in [t+ 1, n])),
which is equivalent to
P(match j in stages [t+ 1, n]) + nP(match i with j in t) ≤ 1.
The previous expression is equivalent to
n∑
τ=t+1
ZτN,j + nz
t
i,j ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ N, j ∈ V, t ∈ [n]. (8)
Inequality family (8) corresponds to a particular case of (7), with |J | = 1, Iτ = N for τ ∈ [t+1, n],
|It| = 1, Iτ = ∅ for τ ≤ t − 1, ατ = 1 for τ ∈ [t + 1, n], αt = n, and ατ = 0 for τ ≤ t − 1.
Furthermore, for a fixed j ∈ V and t = 1, by summing the inequalities over all i ∈ N we obtain
(4c).
Proposition 3. Constraints (8) are facet-defining for the polyhedron of achievable probabilities Q
when t ≤ n− 1.
Proof. Fix i ∈ N, j ∈ V, t ∈ [n − 1]. We construct the following n3 affinely independent points
corresponding to policies that satisfy (8) with equality:
1. Policy for (i, j, t): if i appears in stage t, then match it to j with probability 1/n. This
corresponds to the point 1
n
eti,j .
8
2. Policy for (k, j, τ) with any k ∈ N , and any τ ∈ [t + 1, n]: If k appears in stage τ , match it
to j with probability 1/n, but if k does not appear and i appears in stage t, we match i to j
with probability 1
n
(
1− 1
n
)
. This corresponds to the point 1
n
eτk,j +
1
n
(
1− 1
n
)
eti,j. As we chose
any k and any τ , we have n(n− t) points.
So far, we only have n(n − t) + 1 points. For the remaining points, we can use modifications of
policy 1 above.
• Policy for (k, j, τ) with any k ∈ N and τ ≤ t− 1: If i appears in stage t with probability 1/n,
then match it with j; if i does not appear (with probability 1−1/n), and if k appears in stage
τ (with probability 1/n), then match it with j. This corresponds to 1
n
eti,j+
1
n
(
1− 1
n
)
eτk,j. As
we chose any k, and any τ ≤ t− 1, we have n(t− 1) points.
• Policy for (k, ℓ, τ) with any k ∈ V , ℓ ∈ V such that ℓ 6= j, and τ ∈ [n]: if i appears in stage
t with probability 1/n, then match it with j; if k appears in stage τ (with probability 1/n),
then match it with ℓ. This corresponds to 1
n
eti,j +
1
n
eτk,ℓ. In total, this yields n(n− 1)n points.
• Policy for (k, j, t) with k ∈ V such that k 6= i: if i appears in stage t with probability 1/n,
then match it with j; if k appears in stage t (with probability 1/n), then match it with j.
This corresponds to 1
n
eti,j +
1
n
etk,j. In this family, we have n− 1 points.
If we order these points in a suitable way, they form the columns of a block matrix
A =
(
A1 A2
0 A3
)
,
where A1 is upper triangular and A3 is a diagonal matrix. A1 is formed by the first n(n − t) + 1
points from policy 1 and the policies of item 2, while A2 and A3 are given by the remaining points.
All diagonal entries of A1 and A3 are positive, implying that A has positive determinant. This
shows that the points previously described are linearly independent, completing the proof.
We next compare the inequalities we have introduced so far to the known results for the lower-
dimensional polyhedron Q′ of achievable probabilities that are not time-indexed, which we detail
in Section 2. Recall that Q′ is a projection of Q obtained by aggregating variables ztij over all
stages, zij =
∑
t∈[n] z
t
ij . We already indicated how inequality families (4b) and (4c) are respectively
implied by (6) and (8). We next discuss the right-star inequalities (5).
Theorem 4. Inequalities (8) imply the right-star inequalities (5).
Proof. Fix j ∈ V and I ⊆ N . First, for t = n (8) is simply nznij ≤ 1 (it is also a weakened version
of (6)), and summing over I we get n
∑
i∈I z
n
ij ≤ |I|. For t ≤ n− 1, if we sum over i ∈ I in (8) we
get
|I|
∑
τ∈[t+1,n]
∑
k∈N
zτk,j + n
∑
i∈I
zti,j ≤ |I|, ∀ t ∈ [n− 1],
and since
∑
i∈I z
τ
i,j ≤
∑
k∈N z
τ
k,j, we have
|I|
∑
τ∈[t+1,n]
∑
i∈I
zτi,j + n
∑
i∈I
zti,j ≤ |I|, ∀ t ∈ [n− 1].
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Then, multiply each inequality for t ∈ [n− 1] by 1
n
(
1− |I|
n
)t−1
, and add all of them (including the
one for t = n); the resulting coefficient for each ztij is(
1−
|I|
n
)t−1
+
∑
τ≤t−1
|I|
n
(
1−
|I|
n
)τ−1
= 1.
We thus obtain
∑
t∈[n]
∑
i∈I z
t
ij =
∑
i∈I zij in the left-hand side. In the right-hand side, we get
|I|
n
n∑
t=1
(
1−
|I|
n
)t−1
= 1−
(
1−
|I|
n
)n
.
This result shows that inequalities (6) and (8) yield an upper bound that theoretically dominates
the bound given by LP (4) with additional inequalities (5), the best empirical bound previously
known for OBM [24]. In terms of dimension, the LP given by (6) and (8) with non-negativity
constraints has O(n3) inequalities in Rn
3
, while (4) with (5) has exponentially many inequalities in
R
n2 .
3.1 Policy Design
Theorem 4 establishes that an LP in the space of ztij variables with inequalities (6) and (8),
max
z≥0
{∑
i∈N
∑
j∈V
∑
t∈[n]
wtijz
t
ij : (6), (8)
}
, (9)
is guaranteed to provide a bound at least as good as the state of the art. We can also devise a policy
from the LP (9), in a similar fashion to dynamic bid policies from network revenue management
[1]. Denote by λti ≥ 0 and µ
t
ij ≥ 0 the dual multipliers corresponding to constraints (6) and
(8) respectively. Along the lines of [1, 24] and other approximate DP approaches, we construct an
approximation of the true value function (1): Interpret each λti as the value of having an impression
of type i appear in period t, and similarly interpret each µtij as the value of having impression i
appear in period t when ad j is available to match. For state (t, i, S) this yields the value function
approximation
vt(i, S) ≈ λ
t
i +
∑
τ∈[t−1]
Eη[λ
τ
η ] +
∑
j∈S
(
µtij +
∑
τ∈[t−1]
Eη[µ
τ
ηj ]
)
. (10)
By imposing the constraints from (2) on this approximation of the value function, we obtain the
dual of (9):
min
v≥0
Eη[vn(η, V )] min
λ,µ≥0
∑
t∈[n]
(
Eη[λ
t
η] +
∑
j∈V
Eη[µ
t
ηj ]
)
s.t. vt(i, S ∪ j)− Eη[vt−1(η, S)] ≥ w
t
ij ,
(10)
−−→ s.t. λti + µ
t
ij +
∑
τ∈[t−1]
Eη[µ
τ
ηj ] ≥ w
t
ij .
vt(i, S)− Eη[vt−1(η, S)] ≥ 0,
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Furthermore, by replacing (10) in the DP recursion (1) for a state (t, i, S), we get the heuristic
policy
arg max
{
max
j∈S
{wtij + Eη[vt−1(η, S \ j)]},Eη [vt−1(η, S)]
}
(10)
≈ arg max
{
max
j∈S
{
wtij +
∑
τ∈[t−1]
(
Eη[λ
τ
η ] +
∑
ℓ∈S\j
Eη[µ
τ
ηℓ]
)}
,
∑
τ∈[t−1]
Eη[λ
τ
η ] +
∑
ℓ∈S
∑
τ∈[t−1]
Eη[µ
τ
ηℓ]
}
= arg max
{
max
j∈S
{
wtij −
∑
τ∈[t−1]
Eη[µ
τ
ηj ]
}
, 0
}
. (11)
Intuitively, this policy evaluates the net benefit of a potential match of impression i to ad j in period
t as the match’s weight minus the value we give up by losing ad j in the subsequent remaining
periods. The policy chooses the match with the largest such benefit (if positive), and otherwise
discards the impression.
3.2 Polyhedral Study
Inequalities (8) correspond to a particular case of (7), when the fixed set of ads J has one element.
We can apply a similar idea to a subset of any size; take the next simplest case of (7), a set of size
two, say J = {j1, j2}. Consider also two impressions i1, i2 ∈ N , where we may have i1 = i2. In
terms of probability, the event of matching i2 with j1 or j2 in stage t implies i2 must appear in
stage t with probability 1/n and either of two events happens: First, neither j1 nor j2 are matched
in stages [t+2, n], and then i1 appears in stage t+1 with probability 1/n (and can be matched to
one of the ads or not); and second, j1 or j2 (but not both) are matched in stages [t+2, n], and i1 is
not matched to j1 nor j2 in stage t+1 (this includes the case of another impression being matched
to one of them). Since matching j1 or j2 in t are mutually exclusive events, we have the inequality
P(match i2 with j1 or j2 in t) ≤
1
n
[
1
n
(1− P(match j1 or j2 in [t+ 2, n])) + (1− P(match i1 with j1 or j2 in t+ 1))
]
.
In terms of variables z, this is equivalent to∑
τ∈[t+2,n]
ZτN,J + nZ
t+1
it+1,J
+ n2Ztit,J ≤ 1 + n
∀ it, it+1 ∈ N, J ⊆ V, |J | = 2, t ∈ [n− 2].
(12)
This probabilistic argument can be generalized for any set J ⊆ V with |J | = h ∈ [n − 1] and any
t ≤ n − h. Let (i1, . . . , ih) be a sequence of nodes in N allowing repeats; the general constraint
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corresponds to
P(match ih to some j ∈ J in t)
≤
1
n
[
1
nh−1
(1− P(match j1 or j2 or . . . or jh in [t+ h, n]))
+
1
nh−2
(1− P(match i1 to some j ∈ J in t+ h− 1))
+
1
nh−3
(1− P(match i2 to some j ∈ J in t+ h− 2))
+ · · · + (1− P(match ih−1 to some j ∈ J in t+ 1))
]
.
Therefore, we can give a general expression for this particular subclass of inequalities (7):
n∑
τ=t+h
ZτN,J +
t+h−1∑
τ=t
nt+h−τZτiτ ,J ≤ 1 +
h−1∑
τ=1
nτ ,
∀ J ⊆ V, |J | = h ∈ [n− 1], t ∈ [n− h], it, . . . , it+h−1 ∈ N.
(13)
Theorem 5. Constraints (13) are facet-defining for Q.
The proof of this theorem can be found in the Appendix.
So far we have only considered either Iτ = N or |Iτ | = 1 within inequalities (7). We next
propose a generalization for other sets I. Consider the case J = {j}, and any subset I ⊆ N ;
suppose we naively apply the same argument behind inequality (8). Matching an element of I with
j in stage t implies the intersection of two independent events: First, j is not matched in stages
[t+ 1, n], and second, some element in I appears in stage t. In probabilistic terms,
P(match any element in I with j in t) ≤
|I|
n
(1− P(match j in [t+ 1, n])),
which is equivalent to
|I|
n∑
τ=t+1
ZτN,j + nZ
t
I,j ≤ |I|.
However, this inequality is made redundant by (8), because we can sum over i ∈ I for the same
fixed t to get it.
Consider instead J = {j1, j2}, any I1 ⊆ N with |I1| ≥ 2, and another impression i2 ∈ N ; we
apply the same argument used for (12), but substituting I1 for the single impression i1. Matching
i2 with j1 or j2 in stage t implies i2 appears in stage t with probability 1/n, and either of two
previous events happens: First, neither j1 nor j2 are matched in stages [t + 2, n], and then any
element in I1 appears in stage t + 1 with probability |I1|/n (and is matched to one of the ads or
not); and second, one of j1 or j2 is matched in stages [t+2, n], and no element from I1 is matched
to j1 nor j2 in t+ 1 (this includes the case of another impression being matched to one of them).
Since matching j1 or j2 in t are mutually exclusive, we have
P(match i2 with j1 or j2 in t) ≤
1
n
[
|I1|
n
(1− P(match j1 or j2 in [t+ 2, n]))
+ (1− P(match some i ∈ I1 with j1 or j2 in t+ 1))
]
,
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which is equivalent to
|I1|
n∑
τ=t+2
ZτN,J + nZ
t+1
I1,J
+ n2Zti2,J ≤ |I1|+ n. (14)
As with inequalities (8), if we attempt to naively extend this argument by considering a larger
set I2 instead of the single impression i2, we simply get redundant inequalities. However, we can
generalize (14) using the same argument for (13): For any I ⊆ N with |I| = r ≤ n − 1 and any
J ⊆ V with |J | = h ≤ n− 1, we obtain the inequalities
r
n∑
τ=t+h
ZτN,J + nZ
t+h−1
I,J +
t+h−2∑
τ=t
nt+h−τZτiτ ,J ≤ r +
h−1∑
τ=1
nτ ,
∀ J ⊆ V, |J | = h ∈ [n− 1], I ⊆ N, |I| = r ∈ [n− 1], t ∈ [n− h], it, . . . , it+h−2 ∈ N.
(15)
Theorem 6. Constraints (15) are facet-defining for Q.
For a proof of this theorem, see the Appendix.
In inequalities (15), we do not consider I = N . Suppose we apply the same argument for (14)
in this case; we then obtain
n
n∑
τ=t+h
ZτN,J + nZ
t+h−1
N,J +
t+h−2∑
τ=t
nt+h−τZτiτ ,J ≤ n+
h−1∑
τ=1
nτ .
Dividing by n, we get
n∑
τ=t+h
ZτN,J + Z
t+h−1
N,J +
t+h−2∑
τ=t
nt+h−τ−1Zτiτ ,J ≤ 1 +
h−1∑
τ=1
nτ−1,
which is equivalent to
n∑
τ=t+h
ZτN,J + Z
t+h−1
N,J + nZ
t+h−2
it+h−2,J
+
t+h−3∑
τ=t
nt+h−τ−1Zτiτ ,J ≤ 2 +
h−2∑
τ=1
nτ .
This idea also generates valid inequalities for Q, but we can generalize it even more. Thus far, we
consider an arbitrary subset I in stage t+h− 1, but in this last inequality the arbitrary subset can
“shift” to stage t+ h− 2, so we can actually state a more general valid inequality
r
n∑
τ=t+h−1
ZτN,J + nZ
t+h−2
I,J +
t+h−2∑
τ=t
nt+h−τ−1Zτiτ ,J ≤ 2r +
h−2∑
τ=1
nτ ,
∀ t ∈ [n− h], J ⊆ V, l ∈ [n− 1], I ⊆ N, r ∈ [n− 1], it, . . . , it+h−2 ∈ N.
In this last inequality we only consider r ∈ [n− 1], but as before, we can actually again take I = N
in stage t+ h− 2. After dividing by n, we get
n∑
τ=t+h−1
ZτN,J + Z
t+h−2
N,J +
t+h−2∑
τ=t
nt+h−τ−2Zτiτ ,J ≤ 2 +
h−2∑
τ=1
nτ−1,
equivalent to
n∑
τ=t+h−2
ZτN,J + nZ
t+h−3
it+h−3,J
+
t+h−4∑
τ=t
nt+h−τ−2Zτiτ ,J ≤ 3 +
h−3∑
τ=1
nτ .
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This is also a valid inequality for Q, and we can continue doing this process as many as h− 2 times
until we get
r
n∑
τ=t+2
ZτN,J + nZ
t+1
it+1,J
+ n2Ztit,J ≤ r(h− 1) + n,
which is a generalization of (12). Finally, if we do this process one more time we get
n∑
τ=t+1
ZτN,J + nZ
t
it,J
≤ h,
which is clearly implied by summing over j ∈ J in (8).
Denote by q ∈ [0, h − 2] the number of times we apply this procedure. We now state the most
general family of valid inequalities we have obtained as a specific subclass of (7). We subdivide this
class using a 4-tuple (h, r, t, q), which respectively identifies the size of J , the size of I, the stage, and
the number of times we apply the previous procedure. So, for any J ⊆ V with |J | = h ∈ [2, n− 1],
any I ⊆ N with |I| = r ∈ [n− 1], any t ∈ [n−h], and any q ∈ [0, h− 2], we have the following valid
inequality
r
n∑
τ=t+h−q
ZτN,J + nZ
t+h−q−1
I,J +
t+h−q−2∑
τ=t
nt+h−q−τZτiτ ,J ≤ r(q + 1) +
h−q−1∑
τ=1
nh−q−τ . (16)
We have already proved that the inequalities given by (h, r, t, 0) are facet-defining; here we give the
general result.
Theorem 7. Inequalities (16) identified by (h, r, t, q) are facet-defining for Q when h ∈ [2, n − 1],
r ∈ [n− 1], t ∈ [n− h] and q ∈ [0, h − 2].
Finally, we show the following complexity result for this general family of facet-defining inequal-
ities.
Proposition 8. It is NP-hard to separate inequalities (15), and thus also (16).
Proof. Fix h = r and t. Suppose we have a solution z that is zero (or constant) in all values except
for stage t+ h− 1. In this case, the separation problem for this h, r and t is equivalent to
max{Zt+h−1I,J : I ⊆ N,J ⊆ V, |I| = |J | = h = r}.
This is a weighted version of the maximum balanced biclique problem, which is NP-hard [7]. For
h 6= r, the problem can be transformed to make the two cardinalities equal.
4 Computational Study
4.1 Description of Experiments
Our main experimental goal is testing the effectiveness of our new dynamic relaxations and compar-
ing the new bounds given by these relaxations to several benchmarks. As a secondary goal, we also
study the heuristic policy (11) implied by our relaxation and compare it with the best empirically
performing policy from the literature.
The best empirical bound previously known for OBM is the LP (4) with additional inequalities
(5) [24]. Our results in the previous section establish that (9) is guaranteed to be no worse.
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So we compare these two bounds to determine how much of an improvement the latter LP (9)
offers over the former. In addition, we would like to examine if some of the other inequalities
we introduce can further improve the bound. However, testing these additional inequality classes
involves computational challenges. In particular, the LP’s dimension grows as n3, implying a
relatively large number of variables even for moderately sized instances. This practically limits
both the number of inequalities we consider, and the actual number we can dynamically add to
the LP. To this end, we test adding inequalities (12) to (9); these inequalities are still polynomially
many, Θ(n5), and relatively efficient to separate over. We also considered including inequalities
(17), that is, the special case of (13) with h = n− 1 and t = 1, as they are also simple to separate
over despite numbering Θ(nn). However, our preliminary experiments revealed numerical difficulties
with these inequalities; the smallest non-zero coefficient is 1, while the largest is nn−1, and although
these numbers (and all of the coefficients and right-hand sides of our inequalities) require O(n log n)
space in binary representation and are thus of polynomial size, in practical terms these differences
in scale make it difficult to even determine whether a particular inequality is violated, and thus to
separate over the entire family. We therefore did not include these inequalities in our experiments.
As for lower bounds given by heuristic policies, [24] introduce a time-dependent ranking policy
derived from (4) with additional inequalities (5), and results in this paper establish it as the best
performing policy among several from the literature. We use it as a benchmark to test policy (11).
Finally, we include as additional benchmarks the optimal value given by the DP recursion (1) (for
small instances where it can be computed), as well as the max-weight expected off-line matching,
the expected value of the matching we would choose if we could observe the entire sequence of
realized impressions before making a decision. This latter benchmark is also an upper bound on
the optimal value, as it relaxes non-anticipativity.
4.2 Instance Design and Implementation
All of the instances we tested have n = m = T , with binary edge weights constant over time,
wtij = wij ∈ {0, 1}. In other words, all the instances are max-cardinality OBM problems with static
edges; the static weights are required because the benchmarks we use to compare against do not
accommodate weights that vary over time. We generate instances with the following rubrics:
1. 20 small instances with n = 10, each one randomly generated by having a possible edge in
N ×V be present independently with a probability of 25%, so the expected average degree is
2.5.
2. 20 large, dense instances with n = 100, each one randomly generated by having a possible
edge in N × V be present independently with a probability of 10%, so the expected average
degree is 10.
3. 20 large, sparse instances with n = 100, each one randomly generated by having a possible
edge in N × V be present independently with probability of 2.5%, so the expected average
degree is 2.5.
4. A set of large, k-regular graphs with n = 100 and k ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, constructed in the following
way: Indexing both impressions and ads from 0 to n− 1, each impression i is adjacent to ads
{i, i + 1, . . . , i + k − 1} mod k. The motivation for this last set of experiments is that the
relaxations and policies may behave differently on instances with a high degree of symmetry,
as opposed to randomly generated instances.
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For any experiment requiring simulation, including computing the expected value of the heuristic
policies and the max-weight off-line matching, we used 20, 000 simulations and report the sample
mean and sample standard deviation.
For small instances, all the bound experiments took a few seconds on average. For the larger
instances, we solved the benchmark LP’s following the approach from [24]. For the new bounds, we
formulated (9) but eliminated all variables corresponding to missing edges; this results in models
with an average of 25,000, 100,000 and 10, 000× k variables for sparse, dense and regular instances
respectively. The solution times for these LP’s were roughly one hour for dense instances, and under
a minute for sparse instances, with regular instances varying as k grows. After solving this LP, we
switched to constraint generation for inequalities (12); however, after preliminary experiments we
did this only for small and large sparse instances, because of protracted solve times with minimal
bound improvement in the other cases.
4.3 Summary of Results
Table 1 summarizes the experiment results for all instances except regular ones, which are detailed
individually below. For each instance class, in each row we present the geometric mean of each
bound or policy’s ratio to a fixed benchmark – the DP value for small instances and the max-weight
expected off-line matching for large ones. We also report the sample standard deviation of these
ratios in parenthesis.
Bound/Policy Small Large Dense Large Sparse
(4) + (5) 1.0845 (0.0263) 1.0004 (0.0004) 1.0813 (0.0085)
(9) 1.0407 (0.0099) 0.9739 (0.0011) 1.0283 (0.0050)
(9) + (12) 1.0381 (0.0091) - 1.0278 (0.0050)
Off-Line Exp. Matching 1.0253 (0.0134) 1 1
(1) 1 - -
Policy (11) 0.9974 (0.0017) 0.9561 (0.0025) 0.9627 (0.0066)
TD Ranking Policy [24] 0.9901 (0.0080) 0.9539 (0.0025) 0.9529 (0.0073)
Table 1: Summary of experiment results.
We know from our results in the previous section that the bound given by (9) is guaranteed to
outperform the bound given by (4) with (5). However, our results show that the improvement is
significant, with the new bound cutting the gap by about 4% on average for small instances and
approximately 3% to 5% for large ones. Furthermore, the improvement is consistent across all the
tested instances; in particular, the two bounds never match.
The results for large, dense instances are particularly noteworthy; the new bound from (9) also
beats the max-weight expected off-line matching, not only on average but in every instance. Our
intuition for this result is the following. In dense instances, there is likely a perfect or near-perfect
matching in every realization, and thus the off-line matching will be very close to n in expectation.
Of course, even in a dense instance it may be that no online policy can guarantee a perfect or near-
perfect matching, and explicitly accounting for temporal aspects of the problem, particularly as
inequalities (8) do, captures this phenomenon and tightens the bound, unlike the off-line matching
or the more static approach of the benchmark LP.
Interestingly, our results also reveal that the bound from (9) is not improved much with the
addition of inequalities (12), especially considering the significant additional computing time. In
light of these results, we also performed experiments to test the bound given by (6) and (12)
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only (without inequalities (8)). However, the resulting bounds were much looser, confirming that
inequalities (8) are crucial to providing a tight bound.
In terms of policies, our new heuristic (11) is consistently better than the time-dependent rank-
ing policy, the best performing policy from the literature. This improvement occurs in almost every
tested instance, though the magnitude of the improvement varies. The new policy is near-optimal
for small instances, and cuts the gap for large instances, by about 0.7% to 1% on average in absolute
terms. This improvement in policy quality mirrors results in other areas, such as revenue man-
agement, where heuristic policies derived from time-indexed relaxations also outperform policies
stemming from “static” LP’s; see e.g. [1, 26].
The results for regular graphs are in Table 2, shown here in absolute terms since we are not
averaging multiple experiments. We observe similar improvements in terms of upper bounds, where
our new bound significantly cuts the gap, by around 7%. On the other hand, we observe no
improvement on the policy side. Intuitively, this last result is unsurprising, since both heuristic
policies depend on dual multipliers of LP’s that are symmetric for regular instances, in the sense
that they both have dual optimal solutions in which every value at some stage is equal. Both
policies are thus choosing a match uniformly at random.
Instance (4) + (5) (9) Exp. Matching (11) TDR Policy [24]
3-regular 95.2447 87.9224 85.5680 79.8960 79.8960
4-regular 98.3130 90.9901 89.2247 82.8647 82.8647
5-regular 99.4079 92.8303 91.5918 85.1153 85.1153
6-regular 99.7945 94.0548 93.2837 86.9821 86.9821
Table 2: Experiment results for regular graphs.
5 Conclusions
This work proposes dynamic relaxations for the i.i.d. OBM problem and studies them from a
polyhedral point of view. While several past results have used different LP relaxations, ours is the
first to explicitly consider the time dimension. Among various benefits of the approach, this allows
for the model to accommodate time-varying edge weights, and also allows us to elide the instance’s
structure in the analysis, by capturing all of this information in the problem’s objective. Our study
centers on the polyhedron of time-indexed achievable probabilities Q, and includes a large class
of facet-defining inequalities for this polytope based on choosing complete bipartite subgraphs.
Furthermore, our experiments confirm that the time-indexed approach offers significant benefits;
the bound given by the simplest members of our proposed inequality family already significantly
outperforms the best empirical bounds given by static LP’s, and a heuristic policy derived from
this new bound also significantly outperforms the best policy based on a static relaxation.
Our results motivate a variety of questions for future work. For example, we would like to
understand the structure of valid inequalities that are not based on complete bipartite subgraphs,
to potentially further improve the dual bound. Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination and the software
PORTA, we have derived the full description of Q for small cases, such as n = m = T = 3. We
observed many different inequalities, including some that are somewhat similar to our general family
(7), so there may be a more general class to propose that still lends itself to analysis similar to
ours.
Much of the literature on OBM studies the worst-case performance of heuristic policies based
on relaxations. Although that was not our goal in this work, the positive empirical results we
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observed when implementing our new heuristic policy suggest a similar analysis for that policy,
especially since it appears to differ in structural terms from many OBM heuristics. More generally,
an interesting question is whether a polyhedral analysis similar to ours can be applied to derive
new bounds and policies in related online matching and resource allocation contexts.
Acknowledgments
The authors’ work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grant CMMI
1552479.
References
[1] D. Adelman, Dynamic Bid Prices in Revenue Management, Operations Research 55 (2007),
647–661.
[2] B. Bahmani and M. Kapralov, Improved Bounds for Online Stochastic Matching, Proceed-
ings of the 18th Annual European Conference on Algorithms: Part I, Springer-Verlag, 2010,
pp. 170–181.
[3] D. Bertsimas and J. Nin˜o-Mora, Conservation Laws, Extended Polymatroids and Multi-Armed
Bandit Problems; A Polyhedral Approach to Indexable Systems, Mathematics of Operations
Research 21 (1996), 257–306.
[4] B. Birnbaum and C. Mathieu, On-Line Bipartite Matching Made Simple, ACM SIGACT News
39 (2008), 80–87.
[5] B. Brubach, K.A. Sankararaman, A. Srinivasan, and P. Xu, Online stochastic matching: New
algorithms and bounds, arXiv:1606.06395, 2017.
[6] E.G. Coffman, Jr. and I. Mitrani, A Characterization of Waiting Time Performance Realizable
by Single-Server Queues, Operations Research 28 (1980), 810–821.
[7] M. Dawande, P. Keskinocak, and S. Tayur, On the biclique problem in bipartite graphs, GSIA
Working Paper 1996-04, Carnegie Mellon University, 1996.
[8] J. Feldman, A. Mehta, V. Mirrokni, and S. Muthukrishnan, Online Stochastic Matching: Beat-
ing 1 − 1/e, Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science (FOCS), IEEE, 2009, pp. 117–126.
[9] G. Goel and A. Mehta, Online Budgeted Matching in Random Input Models with Applications
to Adwords, Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
SODA ’08, SIAM, 2008, pp. 982–991.
[10] B. Haeupler, V.S. Mirrokni, and M. Zadimoghaddam, Online Stochastic Weighted Matching:
Improved Approximation Algorithms, Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Internet and Net-
work Economics (WINE) (Berlin-Heidelberg) (N. Chen, E. Elkind, and E. Koutsoupias, eds.),
Springer-Verlag, 2011, pp. 170–181.
[11] P. Jaillet and X. Lu, Online Stochastic Matching: New Algorithms with Better Bounds, Math-
ematics of Operations Research 39 (2014), 624–646.
18
[12] Chinmay Karande, Aranyak Mehta, and Pushkar Tripathi, Online bipartite matching with
unknown distributions, Proceedings of the Forty-third Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, STOC ’11, ACM, 2011, pp. 587–596.
[13] R.M. Karp, U.V. Vazirani, and V.V. Vazirani, An Optimal Algorithm for On-line Bipartite
Matching, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing
(STOC) (New York), ACM, 1990, pp. 352–358.
[14] I. Kra and S.R. Simanca, On circulant matrices, Notices of the AMS 59 (2012), 368–377.
[15] Sumit Kunnumkal and Kalyan Talluri, On a piecewise-linear approximation for network rev-
enue management, Mathematics of Operations Research 41 (2016), no. 1, 72–91.
[16] M. Mahdian and Q. Yan, Online Bipartite Matching with Random Arrivals: An Approach
Based on Strongly Factor-Revealing LPs, Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual ACM Sym-
posium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (New York, NY, USA), ACM, 2011, pp. 597–606.
[17] V.H. Manshadi, S. Oveis Gharan, and A. Saberi, Online Stochastic Matching: Online Actions
Based on Offline Statistics, Mathematics of Operations Research 37 (2012), 559–573.
[18] A. Mehta, Online matching and ad allocation, Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Com-
puter Science 8 (2013), 265–368.
[19] A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, and V. Vazirani, Adwords and generalized online matching,
Journal of the ACM 54 (2007), 22:1–22:19.
[20] M. Puterman, Markov decision processes: Discrete stochastic dynamic programming, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005.
[21] S. Raghvendra, A Robust and Optimal Online Algorithm for Minimum Metric Bipartite Match-
ing, Proceedings of the 19th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Com-
binatorial Optimization Problems and the 20th International Workshop on Randomization
and Computation (APPROX/RANDOM 2016) (K. Jansen, C. Matthieu, J.D.P. Rolim, and
C. Umans, eds.), Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), 2016, pp. 18:1–
18:16.
[22] K.T. Talluri and G.J. van Ryzin, An analysis of bid-price controls for network revenue man-
agement, Management Science 44 (1998), 1577–1593.
[23] C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, On the approximate linear programming approach for network
revenue management problems, INFORMS Journal on Computing 26 (2014), 121–134.
[24] Alfredo Torrico, Shabbir Ahmed, and Alejandro Toriello, A polyhedral approach to online
bipartite matching, Mathematical Programming 172 (2018), no. 1, 443–465.
[25] T. Vossen and D. Zhang, Reductions of Approximate Linear Programs for Network Revenue
Management, Operations Research 63 (2015), 1352–1371.
[26] D. Zhang and D. Adelman, An Approximate Dynamic Programming Approach to Network
Revenue Management with Customer Choice, Transportation Science 43 (2009), 381–394.
19
6 Appendix
6.1 Remaining Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5. The case h = 1 is already covered by the proof of Proposition 3. Consider
the case h = n− 1 and t = 1; the other cases follow a similar construction of linearly independent
points. Let J = {0, . . . , n− 2}, and assume without loss of generality that iτ = i for all τ ∈ [n− 1].
The specific inequality is
ZnN,J +
n−1∑
τ=1
nn−τZτi,J ≤ 1 +
n−2∑
τ=1
nτ . (17)
We know that z ∈ [0, 1]n
3
, but for the description of the points (and the proof) we will just consider
the coordinates involved in the inequality, i.e., z ∈ [0, 1]p, where p := (2n− 1)(n − 1). For the rest
of the points, the construction is similar to the one in the proof of Proposition 3. Recall that
eτk,j denotes the canonical vector in [0, 1]
p, i.e. a vector with a 1 in coordinate (k, j, τ) and zero
elsewhere, indicating a match of impression k with ad j in stage τ . Consider the elements of J as
an (n− 1)-tuple, i.e., (0, . . . , n− 2). For j ∈ J , we define
j + (0, . . . , n− 2) := (j, . . . , j + n− 2) mod (n− 1).
Any addition or substraction with j ∈ J is modulo (n − 1) for the remainder of the proof. We
denote the circulation of J as the following set of (n− 1)-tuples:
circ(J) := {j + (0, . . . , n− 2)}j∈J
= {(0, . . . , n− 2), (1, . . . , n− 2, 0), . . . , (n − 2, 0, . . . , n− 3)}.
Note that circ(J) can be viewed as a matrix. Each element of circ(J) corresponds to a sequence of
ads in the process from stage n to stage 1. Since we have n stages and any of those sequences has
size n− 1, then clearly there is no matching in some stage or an element repeats. We now describe
the family of linearly independent points.
I. Fix k ∈ N and j ∈ J . In stage n, if node k appears, then match it to node j, with probability
1/n. For the remaining stages match according to (j, j+1, . . . , j+n−2) ∈ circ(J). In terms of
probability, if i appears in stage n−1, then it is matched to j with probability (1−1/n) ·1/n.
For the rest, the probability is 1/n. So, we have the point
1
n
enk,j +
1
n
(
1−
1
n
)
en−1i,j +
1
n
n−2∑
τ=1
en−1−τi,j+τ . (18)
By a simple calculation, it is easy to see that each of these points achieves the righ-hand side
of (17). Since we chose an arbitrary k ∈ N and j ∈ J , we have n(n− 1) points in this family.
II. Fix j ∈ J . In this family we repeat j in stages n − 1 and n − 2. If i appears in stage n− 1,
match it to node j with probability 1/n. If i appears in stage n− 2 and it did not appear in
n−1, match it to j with probability (1−1/n) ·1/n. For the remaining stages match according
to (j +n− 2, j, j +1, . . . , j +n− 3) ∈ circ(J); in particular, in stage n match any k ∈ N that
appears with node j + n− 2, in stage n− 3 match i to j + 1 if it appears, and so forth. So,
we have the point
1
n
∑
k∈N
enk,j+n−2 +
1
n
en−1i,j +
1
n
(
1−
1
n
)
en−2i,j +
1
n
n−3∑
τ=1
en−τ−2i,j+τ (19)
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By a simple calculation, we get the right-hand side of (17). Since we chose an arbitrary j ∈ J ,
we have n− 1 points in this family.
III. Fix j ∈ J ; in this family we have two different options in stage n − 3. If i appears in stage
n−1, match it to j with probability 1/n. If i appears in stage n−2, match it to j+1, also with
probability 1/n. If i appears in stage n− 3, match it to j+1 with probability (1− 1/n) · 1/n,
or if j + 1 was matched in stage n− 2, then to node j with probability (1− 1/n) · 1/n2. For
the remaining stages match according to (j + n− 2, j, j + 1, . . . , j + n− 3); in stage n match
any k ∈ N that appears to j + n − 2, in stage n − 4 match i to j + 2 if it appears, and so
forth. So, we have the point
1
n
∑
k∈N
enk,j+n−2 +
1
n
en−1i,j +
1
n
en−2i,j+1
+
(
1−
1
n
)[
1
n2
en−3i,j +
1
n
en−3i,j+1
]
+
1
n
n−4∑
τ=1
en−τ−3i,j+τ+1 (20)
By a simple calculation, we get the right-hand side of (17). Since we chose an arbitrary j ∈ J ,
we have n− 1 points in this family.
IV. Fix j ∈ J and stage s ∈ [n − 4]; the previous family can be generalized for stage s, but
increasing the number of options, i.e., in stage s we have n− s− 1 options from the previous
stages. If i appears in stage n − 1, match it to j with probability 1/n, if i appears in stage
n − 2, match it to j + 1 with probability 1/n, and continue in this way until stage s + 1,
where if i appears, match it to node j + n− s− 2 with probability 1/n. If i appears in stage
s, we consider ads (j + n − s − 2, . . . , j + 1, j) in this order of priority, so that i is matched
to j + n − s − 2 with probability (1 − 1/n) · 1/n; each subsequent ad’s probability of being
matched to i decreases exponentially until j, which has probability (1− 1/n) · 1/nn−s−1. For
the remaining stages (including stage n) match according to (j+n−2, j, j+1, . . . , j+n−3);
in stage n match any k ∈ N that appears with j + n− 2, in s− 1 match i to j + n− s− 1 if
it appears, etc. So, we have the point
1
n
∑
k∈N
enk,j+n−2 +
1
n
n−s−2∑
τ=0
en−τ−1i,j+τ
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−2∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,j+τ
]
+
1
n
s−1∑
τ=1
es−τi,j+n−s−2+τ (21)
The left-hand side of (17) evaluated at this point is
1 +
n−1∑
τ=s+1
nn−τ
n
+
(
1−
1
n
) n−s−2∑
τ=0
nn−s
nn−τ−s−1
+
s−1∑
τ=1
nn−τ
n
= 1 +
n−2∑
τ=1
nτ .
Finally, since we chose an arbitrary j ∈ J and s ∈ [n − 4], we have (n − 1)(n − 4) points in
this family.
V. Fix j ∈ J . For this family we do not match in stage n, and in the remaining stages we match
according to (j, j + 1, . . . , j + n− 2) ∈ circ(J). If i appears in stage n− 1 match it to j with
probability 1/n, if i appears in stage n−2, match it to j+1, and so on. So we have the point
1
n
n−2∑
τ=0
en−τ−1i,j+τ (22)
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By a simple calculation, we get the right-hand side of (17). Finally, since we chose an arbitrary
j ∈ J , then we have n− 1 points in this family.
With these families, we have p points in total. Denote by (k, j, τ) the index of a vector z ∈ [0, 1]p,
which indicates that k ∈ N is matched to j ∈ J in stage τ . In any of these points consider the
following order of components (starting from the first one): (1, 0, n), (1, 1, n), . . ., (1, n− 2, n), . . .,
(n, 0, n), . . ., (n, n− 2, n), (i, 0, n − 1), . . ., (i, n − 2, n − 1), . . ., (i, 0, 1), . . ., (i, n − 2, 1).
The rest of the proof consists of showing that these families define a set of linearly independent
points, and we prove this using Gaussian elimination. Arrange these points as column vectors in a
matrix A,
A = [I, II, III, IV,V] =
(
B1 B2
B3 B4
)
,
where B1 is a n(n− 1)× n(n− 1) diagonal matrix with entries 1/n. These columns can be used to
make B2 a zero matrix, yielding
A¯ =
(
B1 0
B3 C
)
.
Consider how the columns from families II, III, and IV look like after this elimination procedure
(family V is not affected). Fix g ∈ J and sum every point (18) over k ∈ N ; this yields
1
n
∑
k∈N
enk,g +
(
1−
1
n
)
en−1i,g +
n−2∑
τ=1
en−1−τi,g+τ . (23)
IIa. Pick the point (19) associated with g + 1 ∈ J ,
1
n
∑
k∈N
enk,g +
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
1
n
(
1−
1
n
)
en−2i,g+1 +
1
n
n−3∑
τ=1
en−τ−2i,g+1+τ . (24)
Subtract (23) from (24) to get
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
1
n
(
1−
1
n
)
en−2i,g+1 +
1
n
n−3∑
τ=1
en−τ−2i,g+1+τ −
(
1−
1
n
)
en−1i,g −
n−2∑
τ=1
en−1−τi,g+τ ,
which is equivalent to
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
(
−1 +
1
n
)
en−1i,g +
(
1
n
−
1
n2
− 1
)
en−2i,g+1 +
(
−1 +
1
n
) n−2∑
τ=2
en−1−τi,g+τ . (25)
IIIa. Pick the point (20) associated with g + 1 ∈ J ,
1
n
∑
k∈N
enk,g +
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
1
n
en−2i,g+2
+
(
1−
1
n
)[
1
n2
en−3i,g+1 +
1
n
en−3i,g+2
]
+
1
n
n−4∑
τ=1
en−τ−3i,g+τ+2. (26)
Subtract (23) from (26) to get(
−1 +
1
n
)
en−1i,g +
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
1
n
en−2i,g+2 − e
n−2
i,g+1
+
(
1−
1
n
)[
1
n2
en−3i,g+1 +
1
n
en−3i,g+2
]
− en−3i,g+2 +
(
−1 +
1
n
) n−2∑
τ=3
en−1−τi,g+τ .
(27)
22
IVa. Pick the point (21) associated with g + 1 ∈ J and any s ∈ [n− 4],
1
n
∑
k∈N
enk,g +
n−s−2∑
τ=0
1
n
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−2∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
+
1
n
s−1∑
τ=1
es−τi,g+n−1−s+τ .
(28)
Subtract (23) from (28) to get
n−s−2∑
τ=0
1
n
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1 +
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−2∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
+
1
n
s−1∑
τ=1
es−τi,g+n−1−s+τ −
(
1−
1
n
)
en−1i,g −
n−2∑
τ=1
en−1−τi,g+τ ,
which is equivalent to
(
−1 +
1
n
)
en−1i,g +
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
n−s−2∑
τ=1
[
1
n
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1 − e
n−τ−1
i,g+τ
]
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−2∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
− esi,g+n−s−1 +
(
−1 +
1
n
) n−2∑
τ=n−s
en−1−τi,g+τ .
(29)
Since B1 is a diagonal matrix, for the rest of the proof we focus on the matrix C, formed by
points in families IIa, IIIa, IVa and V. Next, we apply Gaussian elimination on C.
IIIb. Subtract (25) from (27),(
−1 +
1
n
)
en−1i,g +
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
1
n
en−2i,g+2 − e
n−2
i,g+1 +
(
1−
1
n
)[
1
n2
en−3i,g+1
+
1
n
en−3i,g+2
]
− en−3i,g+2 +
(
−1 +
1
n
) n−2∑
τ=3
en−1−τi,g+τ
−
1
n
en−1i,g+1 −
(
−1 +
1
n
)
en−1i,g −
(
1
n
−
1
n2
− 1
)
en−2i,g+1
−
(
−1 +
1
n
) n−2∑
τ=2
en−1−τi,g+τ ,
which is equivalent to(
−
1
n
+
1
n2
)
en−2i,g+1 +
1
n
en−2i,g+2 +
(
1
n2
−
1
n3
)
en−3i,g+1 −
1
n2
en−3i,g+2. (30)
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IVb. For every s ∈ [n− 4], subtract (25) from (29),
(
−1 +
1
n
)
en−1i,g +
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
n−s−2∑
τ=1
[
1
n
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1 − e
n−τ−1
i,g+τ
]
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−2∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
− esi,g+n−s−1
+
(
−1 +
1
n
) n−2∑
τ=n−s
en−1−τi,g+τ
−
1
n
en−1i,g+1 −
(
−1 +
1
n
)
en−1i,g −
(
1
n
−
1
n2
− 1
)
en−2i,g+1
−
(
−1 +
1
n
) n−2∑
τ=2
en−1−τi,g+τ ,
which is equivalent to
(
−
1
n
+
1
n2
)
en−2i,g+1 +
1
n
en−2i,g+2 +
1
n
n−s−2∑
τ=2
[
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1 − e
n−τ−1
i,g+τ
]
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−3∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
−
1
n2
esi,g+n−s−1. (31)
IVc. For every s ∈ [n− 4], subtract (30) from (31),
(
−
1
n
+
1
n2
)
en−2i,g+1 +
1
n
en−2i,g+2 +
1
n
n−s−2∑
τ=2
[
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1 − e
n−τ−1
i,g+τ
]
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−3∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
−
1
n2
esi,g+n−s−1
−
(
−
1
n
+
1
n2
)
en−2i,g+1 −
1
n
en−2i,g+2 −
(
1
n2
−
1
n3
)
en−3i,g+1 +
1
n2
en−3i,g+2,
which is equivalent to
1
n
en−3i,g+3 −
(
1
n2
−
1
n3
)
en−3i,g+1 +
(
1
n2
−
1
n
)
en−3i,g+2 +
1
n
n−s−2∑
τ=3
[
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1 − e
n−τ−1
i,g+τ
]
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−3∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
−
1
n2
esi,g+n−s−1. (32)
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IVd. For every s ∈ [n− 5], subtract (32) corresponding to s+ 1 from (32) corresponding to s,
1
n
en−3i,g+3 −
(
1
n2
−
1
n3
)
en−3i,g+1 +
(
1
n2
−
1
n
)
en−3i,g+2 +
1
n
n−s−2∑
τ=3
[
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1 − e
n−τ−1
i,g+τ
]
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−3∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
−
1
n2
esi,g+n−s−1
−
1
n
en−3i,g+3 +
(
1
n2
−
1
n3
)
en−3i,g+1 −
(
1
n2
−
1
n
)
en−3i,g+2
−
1
n
n−s−3∑
τ=3
[
en−τ−1i,g+τ+1 − e
n−τ−1
i,g+τ
]
−
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−4∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−2
es+1i,g+τ+1
]
+
1
n2
es+1i,g+n−s−2,
which is equivalent to
1
n
es+1i,g+n−s−1 +
(
1
n2
−
1
n
)
es+1i,g+n−s−2 +
(
−1 +
1
n
)[n−s−4∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−2
es+1i,g+τ+1
]
−
1
n2
esi,g+n−s−1 +
(
1
n2
−
1
n3
)
esi,g+n−s−2
+
(
1−
1
n
)[n−s−4∑
τ=0
1
nn−τ−s−1
esi,g+τ+1
]
. (33)
For s = n− 4, we do not need this step, since from (32) we have
1
n
en−3i,g+3 +
(
1
n2
−
1
n
)
en−3i,g+2 +
(
−
1
n2
+
1
n3
)
en−3i,g+1
−
1
n2
en−4i,g+3 +
(
1
n2
−
1
n3
)
en−4i,g+2 +
(
1
n3
−
1
n4
)
en−4i,g+1.
Observe that for any s ∈ [n− 4] and g ∈ J , we can multiply row (i, g, s+1) by −1/n and we
get the entry in row (i, g, s).
IIb. Finally, pick a point (22) in family V for g ∈ J ,
1
n
en−1i,g +
1
n
en−2i,g+1 + · · ·+
1
n
e1i,g+n−2. (34)
Now multiply (34) by (1− n) and subtract it from (25) for g ∈ J , yielding
1
n
en−1i,g+1 +
(
−1 +
1
n
)
en−1i,g +
(
1
n
−
1
n2
− 1
)
en−2i,g+1
+
(
−1 +
1
n
) n−2∑
τ=2
en−1−τi,g+τ −
1− n
n
n−2∑
τ=0
en−τ−1i,g+τ ,
which is equivalent to
1
n
en−1i,g+1 −
1
n2
en−2i,g+1.
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Since we have g + 1 in those two stages, we have a general expression for any g ∈ J ,
1
n
en−1i,g −
1
n2
en−2i,g . (35)
As before, we can multiply row (i, g, n − 1) by −1/n to get the entry in row (i, g, n − 2).
Now, we can organize the points in C as
C = [V, IIb, IIIb, IVdn−4, . . . , IV
d
s , . . . , IV
d
1],
where IVds corresponds to the block of points (g ∈ J) with s ∈ [n− 4]. C has the form
C =


Cn−1 Dn−2 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
Cn−2 −
1
n
Dn−2 Dn−3 0 0 . . . 0 0
Cn−3 0 −
1
n
Dn−3 Dn−4 0 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
C2 0 0 0 0 . . . −
1
n
D2 D1
C1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 −
1
n
D1


,
where every Ci and Di are circulant matrices [14] of size (n−1)× (n−1). Since the determinant is
invariant under elementary row and column operations, we can perform Gaussian elimination (of
rows) from bottom to top, and we get
C¯ =


C¯n−1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
C¯n−2 −
1
n
Dn−2 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
C¯n−3 0 −
1
n
Dn−3 0 0 . . . 0 0
...
. . .
...
C¯2 0 0 0 0 . . . −
1
n
D2 0
C1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 −
1
n
D1


,
where
C¯1 = C1 + n(C2 − · · · n(Cn−2 + nCn−1) · · · )
= circ(1/n, 1, n, n2, . . . , nn−3),
Dn−2 = circ(1/n, 0, . . . 0),
Dn−3 = circ
(
1
n
,−
1
n
+
1
n2
, 0, . . . 0
)
...
Ds = circ
(
1
n
,−
1
n
+
1
n2
,−
1
n2
+
1
n3
, . . . ,−
1
nn−s−2
+
1
nn−s−1
, 0, . . . 0
)
...
D1 = circ
(
1
n
,−
1
n
+
1
n2
,−
1
n2
+
1
n3
, . . . ,−
1
nn−3
+
1
nn−2
)
For C¯1, the last entry, n
n−3, is greater than the sum of the remaining entries. The same applies
for Ds, with entry 1/n. Due to Proposition 18 in [14] all these matrices are nonsingular, so C¯
is nonsingular, and therefore C is nonsingular. This implies that A is nonsingular, showing that
these points are linearly independent, and proceeding in the same way as we did in the proof of
Proposition 3 for the remaining components, we can show (17) is facet-defining.
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Proof of Theorem 6. The proof is similar to Theorem 5. Again, assume h = n − 1 and t = 1;
the remaining cases follow a similar construction of linearly independent points. Without loss of
generality we can assume that iτ = i for all τ ∈ [n− 2]. So, we have an inequality of the form
rZnN,J + nZ
n−1
I,J +
n−2∑
τ=1
nn−τZτi,J ≤ r +
n−2∑
τ=1
nτ . (36)
We construct the following linearly independent points.
I. Fix k ∈ N and j ∈ J . In stage n, if node k appears, match it to node j, with probability
1/n. For the remaining stages match according to (j, j +1, . . . , j+n− 2) ∈ circ(J). In terms
of probability, if any k′ ∈ I appears in stage n − 1, then it is matched to j with probability
(1− 1/n) · 1/n, so the probability of matching j in stage n− 1 is (1− 1/n) · r/n. For the rest,
the probability is 1/n. So, we have the point
1
n
enk,j +
1
n
(
1−
1
n
)∑
k′∈I
en−1k′,j +
1
n
n−2∑
τ=1
en−1−τi,j+τ . (37)
By a simple calculation, it is easy to see that each of these points achieves the right-hand
side of (36). Since we chose any arbitrary k ∈ N and j ∈ J , we have n(n− 1) points in this
family.
II. Fix j ∈ J and k ∈ I. In this family we repeat the same ad to match in stages n−1 and n−2.
If k appears in stage n − 1, match it to j with probability 1/n. Then, if i appears in stage
n − 2 and k did not appear in n − 1, match it to j with probability (1 − 1/n) · 1/n. For the
remaining stages match according to (j + n − 2, j, j + 1, . . . , j + n − 3) ∈ circ(J); in stage n
match any k′ ∈ N that appears with j + n− 2, in stage n− 3 match i to j + 1 if it appears,
and so on. So, we have the point
1
n
∑
k′∈N
enk′,j+n−2 +
1
n
en−1k,j +
1
n
(
1−
1
n
)
en−2i,j +
1
n
n−3∑
τ=1
en−τ−2i,j+τ . (38)
By a simple calculation, we get the right-hand side of (17). Finally, since we chose an arbitrary
j ∈ J and k′ ∈ I, we have r(n− 1) points in this family.
V. Fix j ∈ J . In this family we do not match in stage n, and in the remaining stages we match
according to a vector in circ(J). If any k ∈ I appears in stage n − 1, match it to j with
probability 1/n, if i appears in stage n− 2, match it to node j + 1, and so forth. So we have
the point
1
n
∑
k∈I
en−1k,j +
1
n
n−2∑
τ=1
en−τ−1i,j+τ . (39)
By a simple calculation, we get the right-hand side of (17). Since we chose an arbitrary j ∈ J ,
we have n− 1 points in this family.
Families III, and IV remain the same as in the proof of Theorem 5, so in total we have (n− 1)(r+
2n− 2) points. The rest of the proof follows the same argument as Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof follows the same argument as the previous two theorems, the only
difference being that the collection of points given by policies corresponding to I is bigger; however,
they still form a diagonal block, so we can apply the same procedure.
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6.2 Detailed Experiment Results
Instance (4) + (5) (9) (9) + (12) Exp. Matching (1) (11) TDR Policy [24]
S1 8.9613 8.7261 8.7170 8.5818 8.3976 8.3562 8.3452
S2 8.0125 7.7354 7.7147 7.4635 7.4055 7.4095 7.3980
S3 7.0252 6.8849 6.8795 6.8109 6.7241 6.7239 6.6546
S4 8.4799 8.1415 8.1282 8.1360 7.8468 7.8142 7.7895
S5 7.9805 7.4972 7.4654 7.3191 7.0849 7.0590 6.8223
S6 9.2650 8.5601 8.5289 8.4907 8.1364 8.1057 8.0802
S7 7.1327 6.9320 6.9155 6.7885 6.6895 6.6699 6.6709
S8 8.2993 7.8525 7.8181 7.6588 7.4762 7.4631 7.4203
S9 7.0193 6.6523 6.6320 6.4263 6.3451 6.3364 6.2574
S10 7.1206 6.9756 6.9700 6.9593 6.8103 6.7790 6.7588
S11 8.9684 8.5841 8.5519 8.3237 8.1223 8.0996 7.9973
S12 6.7110 6.4682 6.4537 6.3265 6.2555 6.2542 6.2542
S13 7.8013 7.5626 7.5543 7.7048 7.3845 7.3547 7.3122
S14 8.0801 7.7047 7.6880 7.5756 7.4003 7.3787 7.2813
S15 8.2220 8.0324 7.9922 7.9251 7.7369 7.7026 7.7021
S16 9.3714 8.8684 8.8560 8.9708 8.4948 8.4672 8.4034
S17 6.9684 6.8016 6.7739 6.6437 6.5785 6.5717 6.4977
S18 9.3936 8.8414 8.8248 8.8218 8.4484 8.4247 8.3458
S19 7.0304 6.7305 6.7138 6.5861 6.4776 6.4778 6.4772
S20 8.7322 8.4326 8.4139 8.2763 8.0769 8.0485 7.9651
Table 3: Experiment results for small instances.
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Instance (4) + (5) (9) Exp. Matching (11) TDR Policy [24]
LD1 99.8550 97.0381 99.8153 94.8957 94.8471
LD2 99.8035 97.1728 99.7964 95.5454 95.0983
LD3 99.9368 97.2471 99.8325 95.4772 95.1928
LD4 99.9083 97.3543 99.8998 95.7123 95.4918
LD5 99.9135 97.1967 99.9033 95.5889 95.3354
LD6 99.9533 97.3301 99.8303 95.5145 95.2998
LD7 99.9528 97.3809 99.9314 95.7929 95.3830
LD8 99.9100 97.3675 99.9006 95.7148 95.3640
LD9 99.7849 97.1600 99.7414 95.2710 95.0698
LD10 99.8933 97.2112 99.8805 95.6271 95.2136
LD11 99.9175 97.3080 99.8908 95.6526 95.1530
LD12 99.8668 97.3086 99.8597 95.5097 95.5914
LD13 99.7805 97.1135 99.6728 94.9733 94.6578
LD14 99.8641 97.3257 99.7695 95.3197 95.4821
LD15 99.9079 97.1715 99.8723 95.2706 95.2057
LD16 99.7806 96.8779 99.7579 94.8829 94.6222
LD17 99.7620 97.2239 99.7554 95.5676 95.4672
LD18 99.9504 97.3627 99.8417 95.7888 95.5311
LD19 99.9603 97.4715 99.9530 95.8706 95.7686
LD20 99.9392 97.1932 99.9263 95.2861 95.1938
Table 4: Experiment results for large, dense instances.
Instance (4) + (5) (9) (9) + (12) Exp. Matching (11) TDR Policy [24]
LS1 79.1015 74.7635 74.7260 72.3904 69.7186 69.0988
LS2 79.0703 75.3885 75.3555 73.3026 70.8925 70.2621
LS3 78.0157 74.3402 74.3051 72.0072 69.6943 69.1178
LS4 78.6983 74.6555 74.6181 72.3612 69.7633 69.1302
LS5 81.8877 76.7406 76.7085 74.9893 71.6122 70.7586
LS6 81.4750 77.6830 77.6517 75.5756 72.8110 72.3019
LS7 84.0754 79.2133 79.1825 77.4263 73.6374 72.3566
LS8 71.9270 69.5745 69.5391 67.6728 65.7709 65.4557
LS9 77.0648 73.8295 73.7947 71.4234 69.3153 68.5672
LS10 82.5481 77.2318 77.2028 75.3500 72.2398 71.4496
LS11 73.6532 70.8502 70.8139 68.2690 66.2972 64.9590
LS12 81.1134 77.2298 77.1911 74.8116 71.9705 71.3263
LS13 75.2453 72.2625 72.2297 70.0278 67.6604 66.7906
LS14 80.7172 75.8009 75.7654 74.1015 70.7923 70.3709
LS15 74.7313 72.2967 72.2627 69.7801 68.0195 67.1434
LS16 75.9530 72.2955 72.2691 70.2883 67.5794 66.6571
LS17 78.9469 74.2399 74.2093 72.6022 69.4289 68.6303
LS18 79.2340 74.8535 74.8261 73.3324 70.1805 69.6408
LS19 78.6156 75.6028 75.5745 73.7973 71.2080 70.6332
LS20 82.8804 78.4299 78.3911 76.6972 73.1519 72.9224
Table 5: Experiment results for large, sparse instances.
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